Not-for-profit firms are greatly over-represented in the childcare, medical care, education and care for the aged sectors where service providing workers, as well as purchasers, seem to care about the level or quality of service being provided. Since all individuals who care about service levels receive nonexcludable benefits, these services have a public good element. Such care can be used to motivate employees to perform tasks beyond their strict job description. But such care only motivates effort if workers believe it affects the final level of provision. Since nonprofit status ensures management is not directly concerned with profit, or not answerable to owners with such concerns, it ensures workers' efforts 'matter' by committing the firm to not expropriating ext ra worker effort to lower costs or raise profits. Nonprofit firms can thus motivate their work force in a way that for-profit firms cannot match.
Introduction
Existing theories suggest that nonproÞt Þrms should arise in sectors where it is difficult for the purchaser to contract with the provider of the good or service sold. 1 NonproÞts are, indeed, usually found in the provision of services, where this type of contract is difficult to specify.
But most service sectors are exclusively provided by for-proÞt Þrms, whose concern for their reputations ensures delivery of quality service. Existing theories of nonproÞts based on contracting purchase difficulties can not satisfactorily explain why reputations do not similarly work for forproÞt Þrms in sectors where nonproÞt Þrms are widespread. This paper is motivated by the observation that nonproÞts are highly concentrated in the delivery of caring services where the service provided often has a public good component. Examples of such services are childcare, medical care, education and care for the aged. For multi-country evidence on this see Rose-Ackerman (1996, Figure 2 ). In such sectors, service providing workers, as well as purchasers, often have a civic-minded interest in service and consider the level or quality of service important. It is posited here that this is an important distinction between these services and the vast majority of others such as: Þnancial services, insurance, and professional services etc., where much less civic-minded care exists.
The paper demonstrates that nonproÞt Þrms are more effective than for-proÞt Þrms in obtaining care motivated effort, in addition to pecuniarily motivated effort, from workers. Their not-for-proÞt status provides a commitment that donated labor effort, which caring workers give in addition to that given if only pecuniarily motivated, actually affects service and will not be converted by the Þrm into proÞt. Because nonproÞt managers have no (or at least greatly weakened) pecuniary incentives to cut costs elsewhere, nonproÞt employees know that only modest crowding occurs due to their donated effort. In a for-proÞt Þrm, however, residual claimancy provides owners with strong incentives to reduce other inputs in order to proÞt from the worker's donated contribution. Knowing this, workers who care only about the service provided and not employer's proÞts, donate less labour effort than for a nonproÞt employer.
The explanation provided for nonproÞts is similar to the well-known "labour donation hypothesis" (see Rose-Ackerman 1996, p. 719, and Preston 1989, for examples). Like the present explanation, it is posited there that concerned workers may donate labour if they believe in the Þrm's mission. However, as here, such donations are subject to a free-rider problem common to all public goods, which previous statements of this hypothesis do not seriously consider. Since workers do not beneÞt by the very act of donating effort, but instead by the effects of effort on output, they would be better off if, instead of themselves working for low wages in such Þrms, someone else were to do so. This free-riding problem implies that the labour donation hypothesis, 1 in its simplest form, cannot serve as a theory of nonproÞts, because rational individuals will never work below the available market wage (or participation inducing wage) paid by Þrms elsewhere.
There are, however, situations when such labour donations can come about; namely, when the incentive compatible wage strictly exceeds the participation inducing wage. This typically occurs when labour effort cannot be directly contracted over, and the model here develops a relational contract solution to such formal contracting difficulties. In these, the worker is paid a wage strictly in excess of that required to induce participation. In order to keep their job, and wage premium, the worker supplies the non-contracted effort. Importantly, since such jobs pay a wage premium, the free-rider problem endemic to provision of the public good is solved:
workers strictly prefer to work at Þrms offering a wage premium. Furthermore, for-proÞt Þrms are out-competed because the nonproÞts' ability to commit to non-interference allows them to induce worker effort with a strictly smaller premium.
Since previous formulations of the labour donations hypothesis have not taken into account the free-rider problem, they have led to the conclusion that nonproÞt Þrms should pay lower wages than for-proÞt Þrms; for example, this is the interpretation in Mocan and Tekin (2000) . The equilibrium here predicts the opposite: within a sector, wages of identical workers at nonproÞt Þrms should be higher than those of for-proÞts, because nonproÞt Þrms' advantages only arise under a high-wage technology. The next section demonstrates this using a stripped-down model of for-and nonproÞt competition.
The Model
To explicitly contrast with existing explanations, it is assumed here that the service produced is fully contractible. There is a downward sloping market demand curve for the service produced:
where G (p) is aggregate demand for service at price p and dG dp < 0. Purchasers of this service may be the government, private agents, or a combination of both. 2 Time is discrete, a measure N of agents are alive each period. Agents, who are all identical, remain alive with probability β < 1 for another period, and die with probability 1 − β, to be replaced by identical agents. Time subscripts are suppressed and β also acts as a quasi-discount factor. Agents have the following within period preferences deÞned over their consumption of a numeraire good, y, the level of service, G, and the effort they exert at work e, all of which are deÞned on the non-negative real line:
We do not carefully model the utility beneÞt derived by direct purchase of the service, as represented implicitly in equation (1) , as it is orthogonal to the focus here. We are instead concerned with the public good component, G, which enters each individual's utility function separately.
The strength of their concern for this good or service is captured by the parameter γ > 0, which is equivalent for all individuals.
Production is undertaken by Þrms with access to a common production technology. A Þrm is composed of one worker and one manager. The production function converts worker effort into service according to g (e) , with g 0 > 0, g 00 ≤ 0. The actions required of the manager vary with the technology chosen and are speciÞed below. Firms are price takers. The level of service is fully contractible so that each unit produced is sold at its market price, p. Thus the total revenue of a Þrm producing g (e) is pg (e) , and aggregate service level simply adds the output of all producing
Though the production mapping from effort to service level is common across all Þrms, the means of obtaining worker effort may vary. Third party veriÞability of contracts between worker and Þrm is ruled out. Thus payments as a function of effort cannot be enforced. Moreover the worker cannot be the owner of the Þrm. This rules out the trivial solution where self-employed workers provide all output. 3 
Supervision Technology
There are two solutions to the non-contractibility problem here. The Þrst is for the Þrm to use a supervision technology which involves a Þxed cost, F , incurred on a per period basis. This has the advantage of allowing direct monitoring of the worker and thus solving the moral hazard problem.
Relational Contracting
Alternatively, the Þrm can dispense with the need for supervision and use a self-enforcing relational contract that exploits the potential repetition of interaction to provide incentives for the worker. The Þrm pays the worker a total amount we * at the start of the period in return for a promised level of effort e * . If e * is provided, the Þrm re-employs the worker under the same terms in the next period. If effort is below e * , the worker is not re-hired. For w high enough, it is well known that such an arrangement can be incentive compatible; see Macleod and Malcomson (1989) for an early formalization.
Care Does Not Affect Participation Constraints
Since G enters each individual's utility function, it might be conjectured that workers could be motivated by their care to volunteer some of their labor effort, and work for a wage that is below their cost of effort, one. But this cannot happen. Individuals correctly anticipate that any wage they would work for would also have been accepted by someone else. Thus, their accepting work does not affect the level of service provision; i.e., in deciding whether to participate they take G as Þxed. There is thus a form of free-riding problem here which implies that the direct concern for output cannot be used to make individuals accept wages below that necessary to compensate for their disutility of effort (equal to one).
Shirking
Unlike an on-the-spot supervisor, the manager in a relational contract detects shirking only with a lag and can then make up for this only imperfectly -and not by immediate dismissal and re-hiring. The shirker's poor performance implies the level of contracted upon service is not properly provided; e and thus g (e) falls. Recall that since service provision is fully contractible, this should mean the Þrm loses an amount p times the amount of decline in g. To cover for the worker, and perhaps only partially offset the service loss, the manager may provide extra effort herself. This requires taking actions that are not usually part of the manager's job until the shirker is dismissed and a replacement hired (the next period). Since such actions are all departures from the usual (optimally chosen) labor allocation of a non-shirking employee, an efficiency loss is entailed. We model this extra cost by assuming that remedial managerial effort used in production costs α > 1, and thus exceeds the worker's cost of effort.
Differences in organizational type
The owner of a for-proÞt Þrm keeps proÞts, whereas the manager of a nonproÞt Þrm is subject to a non-distribution constraint. Each has a straightforward objective; to maximize utility. The for-proÞt owner is subject to her own budgetary constraint, but since the manager of a nonproÞt is not responsible for the Þrm's losses nor gains, her constraint is less immediate. We impose one here by assuming that the nonproÞt manager is subject to a non-negativity requirement: the projected costs of production have to, at least, be met by expected revenues.
pg (e) ≥ cost(e) for any chosen e.
A more elaborate discussion of the behaviour of nonproÞt managers can be found in Glaeser (2002).
Production With Supervision Technology
By paying the per-period Þxed cost, F , of the supervision technology, the Þrm's owner or manager is able to directly observe and dismiss shirking workers, so that the agency problem is solved.
If this monitoring is effortless, then both for-proÞt owners and nonproÞt Þrm managers are equivalent. However, such efforts are rarely costless, and any ε > 0 effort cost to supervision will see the for-proÞt Þrm have an advantage due to residual claimancy. For brevity, the precise means by which residual claimancy provides a beneÞt will not be formally modeled here, since it is already well known; see Alchian and Demsetz (1972) . The for-proÞt Þrm's actions are then 4 straightforward. The owner chooses e to:
where the workers are paid only to induce participation (one per unit of effort), so that wage payments are e. 4 Given the convexity of the problem, the solution is well deÞned, and moreover there exists a unique p such that the maximized value of proÞts is zero. Denote this price by p f .
If the supervision technology is available to all entering for-proÞt Þrms, a condition of equilibrium will be that any equilibrium price p satisÞes:
Production With Non-supervision Technology
This form of production requires the worker to be paid a wage in excess of her opportunity cost, one, but has the advantage of not requiring the costs of the supervision technology, F . This section compares the effectiveness of both non-and for-proÞt Þrms in the use of this technology.
The for-proÞt Þrm
The worker knows that if not contributing effort correctly she will be dismissed and forego the stream of future wage premia, until obtaining another relational contract. Additionally, output, about which she cares, may fall. The amount of this fall depends on any remedial actions taken by the owner. 5 
Remedial effort by the owner
Suppose that the worker has contributed a level of effort, e w , the owner then chooses e to satisfy: max e pg (e w + e) + γg (e w + e) − αe subject to e ≥ 0.
This yields Þrst order condition:
with at least one equality.
The solution is unique and denoted by e m (e w ) , where the other variables are suppressed. Note also that it can be easily demonstrated that e m (0) > 0.
Let V E (w, e) denote the discounted expected lifetime value to not shirking under a relational contract (w, e): V E (w, e) = we + γg (e) − e + βV E (w, e)
Since optimal shirking implies e = 0, the net lifetime beneÞt of shirking is:
where V U is the present net discounted value of losing one's job and entering into unemployment, solved below. 6 Let ρ denote the (endogenous, in equilibrium) probability that an individual will obtain work at one of these Þrms in any period. For simplicity, assume no other occupations generate such surpluses. Thus we have:
So that
and incentive compatibility implies:
Substituting from (7) and (8) and re-arranging, yields the incentive compatible wage:
If γ = 0, workers and managers do not care about output, then we have the usual relational contract w ≥ 1+βρ β > 1. It is also necessarily the case that g (e) ≥ g (e m (0)) because the cost of managerial effort, α, exceeds worker's costs so that dw dγ ≤ 0, i.e., an employee's concern lowers her incentive compatible wage.
The nonproÞt Þrm
In computing the incentive compatible wage for the nonproÞt employee we proceed as previously and compute the level of output resulting when a worker shirks. In that case, setting e = 0 again.
The nonproÞt Þrm manager chooses e to: max e γg (e) − αe.
Denote this value e a (0) . The nonproÞt manager only provides effort because she cares about output, in contrast to the for-proÞt Þrm owner who took into account proÞts as well as care. We thus have:
Lemma In the event of worker shirking, a nonproÞt Þrm manager provides less remedial effort than a for-proÞt Þrm owner/manager; e a (0) < e m (0)
Proof: Immediate from (6) and (11) .
This is the draw-back of residual claimancy. It provides a weaker commitment to workers that their effort matters, and, because of this, implies they are less willing to donate labor effort out of their concern for output. It thus immediately follows that nonproÞt Þrms can pay their workers' lower incentive compatible wages than for-proÞt Þrms. 7
Result Given ρ, for any e, binding incentive compatible wages in nonproÞt Þrms are
where e a (0) is solved from (11) . These wages are strictly lower than those that would be paid by a for-proÞt Þrm were it to use the supervision technology, solved from (10).
Finally, the no-entry condition for nonproÞt Þrms is:
An immediate implication of this result is that, in equilibrium, the only Þrms using a nonsupervision technology are nonproÞt Þrms, since free entry will ensure that for-proÞts cannot compete in its use. The next section characterizes the equilibrium outcome more fully.
Equilibrium
In reality, many sectors feature non-and for-proÞt Þrms simultaneously providing similar or identical services; see Rose-Ackerman (1996) Table 2 . The model suggests that each organizational type has distinct advantages so that such a mixed equilibrium naturally occurs here.
Description of equilibrium
In a mixed equilibrium, nonproÞts specialize in the non-supervision technology and for-proÞts in the supervision technology. Both earn zero expected proÞts and the market price must be at p f solved in equation (5) . The equilibrating factor is entry of nonproÞt Þrms. If their feasibility constraint under the non-supervision technology were not binding (equation (13) were slack) nonproÞt Þrms would enter and thus push up the incentive compatible wage, by increasing ρ.
Conversely if their constraint were violated, some would exit, ρ would fall, and so too would w n . Moreover, whenever their feasibility constraint binds, that of for-proÞt Þrms fails, so that for-proÞts cannot also use the non-supervision technology.
A feature of the equilibrium is that nonproÞt Þrms pay higher wages than for-proÞt Þrms. At
Þrst sight, the analysis would seem to suggest the opposite: recall the result of the previous section is that for-proÞts would have to pay higher wages if they were to use the supervision technology.
The nonproÞt premium occurs however because, in equilibrium, for-proÞt Þrms cannot proÞtably use the non-supervision technology and must resort to the supervision one. Consequently, since the nonproÞt Þrms specialize in the non-supervision technology, they alone pay a premium to ensure incentive compatibility.
It is, however, also the case that nonproÞt Þrms receive labor donations based on workers' concern for service, whereas for-proÞts do not. Even though for proÞt employees care just as much about the level of service as nonproÞt ones (the term γ is common) this care does not motivate them to donate labor effort: for-proÞt workers' wages are independent of γ since they are working under the supervision technology.
Conclusion
Though able to account for the sectoral breakdown of nonproÞts, the equilibrium implications of the present theory may seem strange. NonproÞt Þrms should be observed to pay more than forproÞt Þrms for identical workers in identical sectors, yet, at the same time, workers at nonproÞt
Þrms should be seen to donate labour effort, whereas their for-proÞt counterparts do not. Mocan and Tekin (2000) using an unusually detailed worker/Þrm matched data set for the US childcare sector, have come up with precisely these Þndings. They found a signiÞcant nonproÞt wage premium (controlling for characteristics of Þrms and workers). However, an unusual question in their data set (What is the main reason for your choice of working in the childcare industry?) also allowed, to my knowledge, the Þrst direct test of the labour donations hypothesis. One of the option answers to this survey question was "I think this is an important job someone needs to do". Choosing the "important job" option had a signiÞcant downward effect on wages if working for a nonproÞt Þrm, suggesting labour donations. In contrast, workers in for-proÞt Þrms who chose this option had either no, or a positive wage premium, suggesting no labour donations.
Future work plans to more carefully investigate this and other implications of the present theory.
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